Marquette Law Review
Volume 12
Issue 1 December 1927

Article 12

Citizenship: Does not descend where father never
resided in United States
Charles L. Goldberg

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Charles L. Goldberg, Citizenship: Does not descend where father never resided in United States, 12 Marq. L. Rev. 68 (1927).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol12/iss1/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

table conversion is invoked and the rights of the mortgagor protected,
not as a mortgagor but as the assignee of a fund.
It seems to us, however, that the court, with equal propriety and correctness, might have arrived at the same conclusion by holding the
chattel mortgage to be good. A review of the cases above mentioned
convinces us that they are not exactly in point with the particular object at issue. It should be remembered that in this case, while the
mortgage was withdrawn from its original place of filing, it was refiled
at the place where the mortgagor resided. The words of the statute
are. 4

"Every mortgage of personal property or a copy thereof may be
filed in the office of the clerk of the town, city or village where the
mortgagor resides .......
No mention is made that the mortgage must be filed at the place the
mortgagor resided at the time of the mortgage. It merely says, "Where
the mortgagor resides."
The case of Gruner v. Star Printing Company, supra, involved a state

of facts entirely different from that in this case. In that controversy
plaintiff gave a written authority to withdraw and destroy the mortgage.
He so did and sold the property to the defendant. There the court
properly held that the withdrawal constituted the destruction of the
validity of the mortgage as against third parties. But, that case is not
affected by the consideration of another filing.
In the case of Bailey v. Costello, supra, the court makes use of the
following language at page 93:
"It was not necessary for the plaintiff, in order to preserve his rights,
to refile the mortgage in the city of Richland Center when Brenden, the
mortgagor, removed to that place and kept the horse there .......
In this case likewise, the question of another filing is not involved.
From the language used it is apparent that such additional filing
"is not necessary." In other words, such filing would be surplusage. But
the exact fine point is not decided. True, with the original filing additional filing is not necessary, but can it not be said that when the original
filing fails, that which was considered heretofore unnecessary, may be
the saving point. Strictly, the situation in this case conforms to the
statute. The mortgage is filed at the place the mortgagor resides. The
cases cited merely show that additional filing is not necessary to a mortgage already validly filed. But it is the writer's firm opinion that while
it may not be necessary to a good mortgage, it may be sufficient to
prevent the failure of a mortgage which has been attacked because the
original filing has been invalid or withdrawn.
CHAS. L.. GOLDBERG
Citizenship: Does not descend where father never resided in
United States*
Chin Bow, a Chinese boy of ten, applied for admission to the United
States at Seattle. The Board of Special Inquiry of the Immigration
Bureau of Seattle denied him admission on the grounds that though his
father was an American citizen, he had not resided in the United States
'Sec. 241.10.

* JVeeden v. Chin Bow, 47 Sup. Crt. Rep. 772.
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at or prior to Chin Bow's birth. The Secretary of Labor affirmed the
decision of the Board of Inquiry and the deportation of the respondent
was ordered. A writ of habeas-corpus was obtained, and upon a hearing an order discharging Chin Bow from the custody of the board, was
obtained, and upon appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the district court.
Weedin, the Commissioner of Immigration, appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, and was represented by the Solicitor General of
Washington. The Chinese boy was represented by Charles E. Hughes
of New York.
Mr. C. J. Taft delivered an extremely able and interesting decision
interpreting for the first time, a provision of Sec. 1993, R.S., which had
been originally passed in the first Congress in 179o.
The rights of Chin Bow depended upon a construction of a proviso in
that section which reads as follows:
All children heretofore born or hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers were or may be at the time of their
birth citizens thereof, are declared to be citizens of the United States, but the
rights of citizenship shall not descend to children whose fathers never resided
in the United States.

In the words of the Court:
It is claimed for the respondent that residence of the father at any time in
the United States before his death entitles his son whenever born to citizenship.
The United States contends that the proviso of Section 1993 "but the rights
of citizenship shall not descend to children whose fathers never resided in the
United States" must be construed to mean that only the children whose fathers
have resided in the United States before their birth become citizens under the
section. These conflicting claims make the issue to be decided.
Mr. Justice Gray, in United States v. Wong Kim, Ark. 169. V.S.
649, established that at Common Law in England and in the United
States citizenship was a matter of location at birth, and that this rule
of Common Law could not be changed except by Statute: England,
then by two statutes, 7 Anne and 13 George III extended that rule until
it was the law that children and grandchildren of English citizens obtained the rights of citizenship, but that the issue of such grandchildren
did not. These statutes applied to the colonies before the War of Independence.
In 1790, Congress passed an act entitled "An act to establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization" which act contained the proviso above
noted. In 1795 this act was repealed but the provisions relative to
children born beyond the sea was re-enacted in similar terms. In 1802,
Congress repealed all former naturalization acts, enacting one to take
its place, (2 Stat. 153), and in the legislation passed to replace it, the
same proviso above referred to is found. In 1855, additional changes
were made in the naturalization laws, but nevertheless in the act of
February Io, 1855, IO St. 604, we again find re-enacted. "Provided,
however, that the rights of citizenship shall not descend to persons
whose fathers never resided in the United States." This section was
embodied in the present law as Section 1993 in the Revised Statutes.
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Inasmuch as this section has been embodied in our laws, and without
substantial change, from the very commencement of our National life it
is clear that any interpretation thereof must be made in the light of the
intent of the Congress originally passing it. It is evident from the
reports of their proceedings that Naturalization laws were fully discussed. Congress had before it at that time the English Statutes which
conferred British citizenship on grandchildren of British subjects born
abroad. Congress, however, was not willing to make so liberal a provision inasmuch as there were children of citizens of the revolutionary
colonists whose loyalty to the United States might well be doubted.
Quoting from the Court:
It is not too much to say that Congress at that time attached more importance
to actual residence in the United States as indicating a basis for citizenship
than it did to descent from those who had been born citizens of the colonies
or of the states before the Constitution. As said by Mr. Fish, when Secretary
of State to Minister Washburn, June 28, 1873, in speaking of this very proviso,
"The heritable blood of citizenship was thus associated unmistakably with residence within the country, which was thus recognized as essential to full citizenship."

Of the two possible constructions of the proviso, the court adopts
that which favors the contention of the petitioner, namely, that for
citizenship to descend to foreign born children, their fathers must have
resided in the United States at or prior to the time of the birth of such
children. This is in effect a harkening back to the original common law,
making location and residence at time of birth one of the essential
factors of nationality. The ruling effectively and succinctly takes the
position that affiliation with the United States is sought for-not merely
the indiscriminate granting of a valuable right-namely American
Citizenship.
In order to support its conclusion the court argues that inasnmuch as
Comp. Statutes 3963 makes it necessary for foreign born children who
are citizens by Sec. 1903 to record their intention of becoming residents
and remain citizens of the United States upon their becoming eighteen
years of age, the intention of Congress may be seen as thereby interpreting Section 1993.

If Section 1993 were to be construed to mean

that children might acquire citizenship when their father resided in the
United States, Congress would have made use of the words in Comp.
Statute 3963-"All children who are or may become citizens." The
failure to so provide, in the eyes of the court, showed the intention of
congress to have citizenship attached at birth-and not at any subsequent time.
The proviso makes use of the expression "the rights of citizenship
shall descend." The word "descend" is a term borrowed from property
law and has a definite meaning. It means to pass down from generation to generation. The concluding paragraph of the Court's decision
continues:
The expression, "the rights of citizenship shall descend," cannot refer to
the time of the death of the father, because that is hardly the time when they
do descend. The phrase is borrowed from the law of property. The descent
of property comes only after the death of the ancestor. The transmission of
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the right of citizenship is not at the death of the ancestor but at the birth of
the child, and it seems to us more natural to infer that the conditions of the
descent contained in the limiting proviso, so far as the father is concerned,
must be perfected and have been performed at that time.

CHARLES L. GOLDBERG
Constitutional Law:
part.*

Federal Gift tax held unconstitutional in

In case of John W. Blodgett v. Charles Holde, decided November
22, 1927, and reported in the United States Daily of that date, page 13,
the United States Supreme Court held that the gift tax law (Revenue
Act of 1924, Sec. 319-24) insofar as it undertook to impose a tax upon
gifts made before the passage of the Act, was unconstitutional, as arbitrary and invalid under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Thus a much litigated and difficult question is disposed of. See MARQUETTE LAW RE VEW, April, 1927, Vol. XI, No. 3, page 1.15.
This Act, commonly called the Gift Tax, was passed on June 2, 1924,
and provided that for the calendar year of 1924 and each calendar year
thereafter, a tax should be imposed upon the transfer by gift during
such calendar year of any property, whether made directly or indirectly,
etc. This act was in effect for only two years. In the Blodgett case the
gifts were made during January, 1924. These were held taxable by the
United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan,
reported in ii Fed. (2nd) i8o. This was appealed to the Circuit
Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit, which court without attempting
to decide the questions involved, certified the matter to the United
States Supreme Court. All the United States Supreme Court Justices
concurred in the result, but on different grounds. The main opinion,
which apparently was concurred in by five of the Justices, holds that
the Act is unconstitutional as applied to gifts made before the passage
of the Act. Four of the justices joined in a separate opinion, which in
effect holds that they do not consider it necessary to pass on the
constitutionality phase of the case as they construe the Act to mean that
it was not intended to be retroactive and was not designed to tax any
gifts made before the passage of the Act on June 2.
There is another case pending in the United States Supreme Court
involving the same question, i.e. McNer v. Anderson, reported in
io Fed. (2nd) 813, and 16 Fed. (2nd) 970. This involves the same
facts as the Blodgett case and doubtless the judgment of the Circuit
Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit, holding the tax constitutional,
will be reversed.
It will be noted that the Blodgett case does not pass upon the constitutionality of the Act in so far as it affects gifts made after the passage of the Act. So far as we know there are no cases pending in
United States Supreme Court at the present time involving that
question.
JAmES T. Guy
* See article in April, 1927, issue of MARQUETTE LAW Raviw on "Unconstitutionality of Federal Gift Tax," by James T. Guy.

